The notion of inertia is explicated in terms of forces recorded in snapshots that are strung together to represent events. The role inertia worlds were conceived to serve in the semantics of the progressive is assumed by a branching construct that specifies what may follow, apart from what follows.
INTRODUCTION
Sentences such as (1) illustrate the observation in Dowty (1979) that an event in progress at time I in world w may fail to culminate in w.
(1) Pat was losing when the match took an unexpected turn. Dowty employed the notion of an (I, w)-inertia world to insure that an event e in progress at I in w culminates somewhere-namely, in every (I, w)-inertia world. We may expect e to culminate in w inasmuch as we may expect w to be an (I, w)-inertia world. As there is no law making w an (I, w)-inertia world, however, e need not culminate at w. But then can we assume (I, w)-inertia worlds exist? Surely we may assume that there are events other than e in progress at I in w. Can we be certain not one of them clashes with e down the line? Landman (1992) credits the following example to Roger Schwarzschild.
Suppose I was on a plane to Boston which got hijacked and landed in Bismarck, North Dakota. What was going on before the plane was hijacked? One thing I can say is: 'I was flying to Boston when the plane was hijacked.' This is reasonable. But another thing I could say is: 'I was flying to Boston. Well, in fact, I wasn't, I was flying to Bismarck, North Dakota, but I didn't know that at the time.' And this is also reasonable. (pp. 30-1) With this (or perhaps a different example) in mind, let us suppose another event e# were to be in progress at I in w that culminates only in a world where e does not. Then, the requirement that e and e# culminate at every (I, w)-inertia world would mean there is no (I, w)-inertia world (rendering talk of inertia worlds pointless). This suggests refining the relativization (I, w) on inertia worlds to discriminate between events e and e# that are headed for a conflict. The alternative is to deny that such events can be in progress at the same pair (I, w). Stepping back, we might ask what (on earth) an inertia world is. Are our intuitions about inertia worlds coherent and reliable enough that we can be comfortable with a semantic account that treats inertia worlds as primitive?
Rather than take inertia worlds for granted, the present work pursues a constructive approach, building worlds bottom-up from temporal propositions. I shall refer to these propositions as fluents, following the custom in artificial intelligence since McCarthy & Hayes (1969) and more recently in linguistic semantics (van Lambalgen & Hamm 2004 ). Very briefly, (i) the notion of inertia is fleshed out against fluents (as opposed to worlds), some of which are assumed to be inertial while others describe forces, and (ii) a world is formed from the events that happen in it where an event is formulated as a string of sets of fluents (Fernando 2004 ). The analysis of inertia and worlds in (i)-(ii) stops short of addressing modal matters such as the implication (2b) of a natural reading of (2a).
(2) a. Pat stopped the car before it hit the tree.
b. The car did not hit the tree but it might well have.
To interpret (2b), we need structures recording what may happen, over and above what does happen. Accordingly, strings are extended to branching strings, which are closed under not only concatenation but also a second binary operation. That second operation yields branches recording some of the ways things may turn out under historical necessity (e.g. Thomason 1984) . Branching is, I claim, implicit in the step from a world w to the set of (I, w)-inertia worlds. What's more, it is branching, and not some notion of inertia world, that figures in the semantics of the progressive formalized below. To motivate that formalization, section 2 examines entailments ' of progressive forms that are associated with the appropriateness of temporal modification by for, as opposed to in (Vendler 1967) . (4) a. Pat was walking home 0 Pat walked home b. Pat walked home in (?for) five minutes. As for inertia, section 3 investigates its role in the contrast between the simple past and the present perfect (e.g. Steedman 2000) . Inertial laws are laid down specifying the persistence of inertial fluents in the absence of forces. We work with events as in Parsons (1990) and Landman (1992) , and follow the latter in looking at what might become of an event in progress, for a glimpse at modal implications of the progressive related to (2). That is, we explore 'continuations branches' as in Landman's semantics of the progressive, but without appealing to 'a Stalnaker-style theory of subjunctives' or (for that matter) worlds. Instead, continuation branches are construed perspectivally on the basis of the structure on events induced by their string representations. Entailments can be read directly off strings, making it unnecessary to resort to worlds to define entailments in terms of truth at worlds. Rather than sets of worlds as propositions, we study sets of strings as event types. And rather than defining entailment ' between propositions p and q by the subset relation 4 p ' q 5 def p4q ðas sets of worldsÞ,
we refine 4 to a subsumption relation V (defined in the next section) between sets of strings. The refinement needed here is the key to the analysis of branching in section 4.
EVENT TYPES AS SETS OF STRINGS
Underlying our representation of events as strings is the intuition that an event is 'a series of snapshots' (Tenny 1987) . Equating a snapshot with a set of fluents that describe it, we represent an event as a string a 1 a 2 . . . a n of sets a i of fluents describing n successive moments. We finesse questions about the choice of successive moments and string length n by working with a set of strings. For instance, we might associate rain from dawn to dusk with the set ½rain; dawn½rain * ½rain; dusk ¼ f½rain; dawn½rain n ½rain; duskjn > 0g of strings [rain, dawn] [rain] n [rain, dusk] with (n + 2) snapshots, all of rain, the first at dawn and the last at dusk. The different values of n correspond to different levels of temporal granularity (the larger the n, the finer the grain).
1 We use square brackets [ and ] , instead of curly braces, to enclose a set of fluents when it is intended as a snapshot. Boxes are arguably preferable to square brackets, but are a nuisance to typeset. Hence, we will refrain from drawing boxes except for the empty snapshot, which we write h instead of []. Beyond reinforcing the filmstrip metaphor, this helps distinguish the string h of length 1 (containing no fluents) from the empty string set ; (containing no strings). We refer to a string set as a language (as in formal language theory), and write * for Kleene star, L + for LL * and + for nondeterministic choice. We collect the fluents in a set U, turning snapshots into elements of the powerset Pow(U) that serves as our alphabet. Snapshots here are (unlike McCarthy & Hayes 1969 ) partial: h is as much a part of [u] as it is of [ u] , where u is the negation of u. Henceforth, we assume that every fluent u comes with another fluent u 6 ¼ u and that u ¼ u. A snapshot may be u-underdefined in that it contains neither u nor u (e.g. h), or else it may be u-overdefined, containing both u and u. Whereas u-underdefinedness simply reflects the partiality of observations, u-overdefinedness indicates that the observation has gone awry. This suggests restricting the alphabet Pow(U) to the family ncðUÞ def fa 2 PowðUÞjð"u 2 aÞ u;ag of non-contradictory snapshots (assembled from U). Nevertheless, we will define operations and relations on languages over the alphabet Pow(U), as it is easy enough to intersect a language L 4 Pow(U) * with nc(U) * (and indeed other constraints) to weed out spurious descriptions. A natural conjunction of languages L, L# over Pow(U) is the superposition L & L# of L and L# obtained from the componentwise union of strings in L and L# of the same length Fernando 2004) . For example, we have (6).
To capture the growth of information from &, let us say that L subsumes L# and write
(roughly: L is at least as informative as L#). Conflating a string s with the singleton language {s}, we get (7) and (8). (7) states that V holds between strings of the same length related componentwise by inclusion. (8) says L subsumes L# exactly if each string in L subsumes some string in L#.
As (9) illustrates, we may regard a comma inside a box as conjunction, and plus between strings as disjunction.
That is, as a type with instances s 2 L, a language L is essentially a disjunction ¤ s2L s of conjunctions s (Fernando 2004) . Subsumption V and superposition & go hand in hand in specifying languages LðAÞ for English sentences A such as those in (3) and (4), repeated here. The general idea is to reduce entailment to subsumption and trace the unacceptability of A to the disjointness of LðAÞ from nc(U) * . (Note that a language L is disjoint from nc(U) * iff every string a 1 . . . a n in L is contradictory in that for some u e U, both u and u belong to some a i .)
b. ?A because LðAÞ \ ncðUÞ * ¼ ;
Leaving inflection from tense and aspect out for the moment, we assume a fluent home(p) (saying Pat is home) is negated in the language L(Pat walk home) until the very end.
(11) LðPat walk homeÞ V ½homeðpÞ + ½homeðpÞ (11) says LðPat walk homeÞ is home(p)-telic, where we call a language
2 More generally, we collect fluents that appear at the end of every L-string in the set x L of fluents u such that LVh * ½u
and define L to be telic if LVx L * h, where the negation a4PowðUÞ of a 4 U is (in accordance with De Morgan) the disjunction (given by +) of negations of fluents in a
As for LðPat walkÞ, let us call L iterative if LVhx * L . Now, suppose we analyse the interval five minutes as in (12), with fluents 0(s) and 5min(s) saying that zero time and five minutes have (respectively) passed since time s.
(12) Lðfive minutesÞ V ½0ðsÞh + ½5minðsÞ
Then, we can put down the contrast between (3b) and (4b) to (13), and an interpretation of temporal in-and for-modification by the superpositions in (14) with a language I representing the temporal interval.
(3) b. Pat walked for (?in) five minutes.
(4) b. Pat walked home in (?for) five minutes.
(13) a. LðPat walk homeÞ is telic. b. LðPat walkÞ is iterative. Assuming I is durative, we derive (15) and (16), matching telic and iterative languages with temporal in-and for-modification, respectively. Next, for tense and aspect, we adopt a Reichenbachian approach that locates the event time E relative to not only a speech time S but also a reference time R (Reichenbach 1947). To see how R might be useful, consider the pair in (5a,b). with tense operators for the past and present applied after operators for simple and perfect aspect. If an event with temporal projection E is represented by a language L, we get three aspectual operators on L.
As a position from which to view the event represented by L, R says in the case of SIMP(L), that the event has reached completion; in the case of PROG o (L), that it has not quite gotten there yet but is on its way; and in PERF o (L), that it is history. The subscript o on PERF and on PROG marks the need for additional operations that concern inertia and branching, respectively. We will attend to these complications in sections 3 and 4. For now, we work with truncated forms given by the following definitions. A string a 1 . . . a n is R-truncated if R; [ 1<i<n a i .
(Thus, h[R] is R-truncated, whereas [R]h is not. Also, any string where R does not occur is R-truncated.) The R-truncation s R of a string s is the longest R-truncated prefix of s; that is, (corresponding to the truncated progressive in Parsons (1990) , as opposed to that in Landman (1992) which we reformulate in section 4). We can now take up (3a) and (4a) via the approximations (19) and (20), respectively, suggested by (10a). 19) and (20) leave out the speech time S contributed by the past tense in (3a) and (4a). We will see in the next section that our arguments for (19) and (20) remain intact after S is added for (3a) and (4a). An easy route to (19) and (20) is (21). (21) 
Assuming LðPat walk homeÞ 4 nc(U) * , the telicity (13a) of LðPat walk homeÞ yields (20). Clearly, (19) and (20) hold for various refinements of the languages mentioned there.
3
In the next section, we consider refinements of languages given by constraints of the form L 0 L#. These constraints are comparable in function to meaning postulates, and typically lead to the addition of fluents. A simple example (injecting a bit of world knowledge) is
requiring that any stretch of time that begins with dawn and ends in dusk contains noon. In general, the idea is that for any languages L and L# over the alphabet Pow(U), the constraint L 0 L# is the set of strings s 2 Pow(U) * such that every stretch of s that subsumes L also subsumes L#.
The precise notion of stretch is given by that of a factor, where s# is a factor of s if s ¼ us#t for some (possibly empty) strings u and t. We then define
for every factor s# of s; s#VL implies s#VL#:
For the case of 
where, in general, L V is the set of the V-minimal strings in L 3 A refinement relevant to the progressive has to do with incremental changes in the degree to which a fluent u holds. We can encode increases in the degree of u as ðdxÞ u-degðxÞ^ðdy < xÞ previous u-degðyÞ using a temporal operator previous to shift back one moment in the past.
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by guest on March 14, 2011 jos.oxfordjournals.org L V def fs 2 Ljð"s# 2 LÞ sVs# implies s ¼ s#g:
but that (s1) allows us to impose C on L by intersection in (s2). We tidy up in (s3), removing excesses from (s1), as
Evidently, L C V L.
INERTIA AND FORCE
Turning now to inertia, consider (2a).
(2) a. Pat stopped the car before it hit the tree. Does (2a) imply that the car hit the tree after Pat stopped it? Not quite. By stopping the car, Pat negates a precondition for Lðcar hit treeÞ, that precondition being that the car not be at rest If the car is to hit the tree, some force must put the car back into motion. In the absence of an intervening force on the stopped car, (2a) suggests that the collision was avoided.
To formalize such reasoning, let us fix a set Inr 4 U of inertial fluents such that whenever u 2 Inr, u 2 Inr and there is a non-inertial fluent fu marking the application of a force to make u true at the next moment. We can then express persistence of an inertial fluent u as the constraint
) stating that u persists unless some force is applied to make u true (that is, u false). Forces that make u true appear in the backward persistence constraint (pbk) h½u 0 ð½uh + ½f uhÞ stating that if u is true, it must have been so previously or else was forced to be true. Differentiating f u from f u allows us to formulate the constraint 'succeed unless opposed' (suo) ½f uh 0 ðh½u + ½f uhÞ saying an unopposed force on u brings u about at the next moment.
Were fu and f u the same, (suo) would have no bite (denoting, as it would, the universal language Pow(U) * ). For u equal to car-at-rest, the collision in (2a) is put into question from two directions: forward from car-at-rest and backward from car-at-rest. One direction is enough to block the inference that the car hit the tree-which is fortunate, as we will shortly be forced to modify (per).
Consider again the minimal pair (5), which we can analyse partially via (22), where in(p, d) is an inertial fluent for Pat-in-Dublin and R and S are non-inertial fluents for reference and speech time. LðPat has left DublinÞ V ½inðp; dÞh * ½inðp; dÞ;h * ½R; S
To account for the contrast in (5) on the basis of (22), it suffices that inðp; dÞ persists forward in (22b) but not in (22a).
(23) a. LðPat left DublinÞ X h + ½inðp; dÞ; S b. LðPat has left DublinÞ V h + ½inðp; dÞ; S To derive (23b) from (22b), we need only appeal to (per) and the assumption that in (22b) no force is applied against inðp; dÞ alongside its (displayed) occurrence. By contrast, in (22a)/(23a), it would appear that R blocks inðp; dÞ from flowing to the right, just as a force against inðp; dÞ would. Accordingly, we weaken (per) for every inertial u to (peR) ½uh 0 ðh½u + ½f uh + ½RhÞ adding the possibility ½Rh to the right-hand side as an alternative to inertial flow h½u. 4 Independent confirmation that R is a barrier to forward persistence is provided by (24). 4 Instead of weakening (per) to (peR), it is tempting to assume that R applies a force against all inertial fluents u occurring alongside it.
ðRaf Þ ½R; u 0 ½f u Unfortunately, (Raf) would wreck our account of the non-veridicality in (2a), assuming R is put at the end of LðPat stop carÞ.
A Reichenbachian approach to tense locates S relative to R. Let us write 'R < S' for the set of strings where R precedes S 'R < S' def fa 1 . . . a n jð"i such that R 2 a i ÞS; [ 1<j<i a j g and 'R ¼ S' for the set of strings where R and S co-occur 'R ¼ S' def fa 1 . . . a n jð"iÞ R 2 a i 5 S 2 a i g: These constraints are hard inasmuch as the implications L 1 0 L 2 are non-defeasible. Indeed, (2a) non-defeasibly implies (25).
(25) Unless some force put the stopped car back in motion, the car did not hit the tree. To assume that in a language L, no forces apply except those explicitly appearing in L is to restrict the application L C of the inertial constraints C to L as follows. In step (s1) for L C , we restrict the fluents added to the set Inr of inertial fluents, superposing L with Pow(Inr) * , rather than all of Pow(U) * . If we then carry out steps (s2) and (s3), the end result refines L C to It may be the case that for the perfect operator to apply to a language L, some forces must be at work in L.
Defeasibility in inertia creeps in not through
So why in (2a) are we so reluctant to add forces enabling the car to hit the tree?
Perhaps because, as we will see in the next section, we are not forced to; we may branch.
BRANCHING AND COHERENCE
Whether or not the most natural reading of (2a) implies (2b), the question arises: How are we to interpret (2b)?
(2) b. The car did not hit the tree but it might well have.
Under dynamic semantics, the sentence the car did not hit the tree eliminates all epistemic possibilities where the car hit the tree, making the clause the car might have hit the tree unacceptable (Veltman 1996) . This is all well and good if might is read epistemically as in (2c).
(2) c. The car did not hit the tree but ?for all we know, it might have.
There is, however, a metaphysical reading of might, under which (2b) is perfectly acceptable (Condoravdi 2002) .
(2) d. Had Pat not stopped the car, it might well have hit the tree.
To make sense of might in (2d), let us assume that we can turn a string s into a fluent may(s) saying roughly that from the next moment on, s may be observed. We will presently do away with such fluents may(s), but for now, they are convenient for making the following point. In (27), if the string s 1 depicts car stop and s 2 depicts car hit tree, then s 3 depicts car stop but may have hit tree.
(27) a. s 1 def ½car-at-rest ½car-at-rest b. s 2 def ½car-at-rest; car-tree-contact½car-tree-contact c. s 3 def ½car-at-rest; mayðs 2 Þ ½car-at-rest
Whereas information in Veltman (1996) grows solely by elimination, we not only have L4L# implies LVL# but also expansive growth such as
in (27). Veltman's might depends on the full epistemic state for its interpretation (and is in this sense said to be non-distributive); the fluent may(s) is interpreted pointwise at each possibility in the epistemic state. Up to now, the points in our epistemic states have been strings. To interpret may(s), we extend strings to branching strings formed from an alphabet not only by concatentation, with ss# saying s# follows s, but also by a second binary operation b, with b(s,s#) saying s# may follow s.
We should be careful not to confuse non-deterministic choice + with b. Epistemic uncertainty is encoded by + through a set of strings (branching and otherwise), whereas b encodes metaphysical non-determinism within a branching string. (Introducing metaphysical possibilities via b adds information insofar as it eliminates epistemic possibilities in which the branches are ruled out as metaphysical possibilities.) To illustrate, we can flesh out s 3 in (27) as the branching string ŝ def bð½car-art-rest; s 2 Þ½car-at-rest:
In ŝ, the first snapshot ½car-at-rest is followed by [car-at-rest] , which clashes with the first snapshot of s 2 (on whether or not the car is at rest), making s 2 a counterfactual continuation of ½car-at-rest. 5 We can read (28) off ŝ inasmuch as chopping off the suffix [car-a-rest] from ŝ restores s 2 as a live option after ½car-at-rest.
(28) Had it not stopped, the car may have hit the tree.
What is the general mechanism for forming ŝ from s 1 and s 2 ? The mechanism is a generalization & R of superposition & based on a restriction R 4 Pow(U) of the alphabet Pow(U) to a fixed set R of 'legal' snapshots. For R ¼ Pow(U), & R is just &. But the idea behind throwing out from R a snapshot such as ½car-at-rest; car-at-rest ¼ ½car-at-rest [ ½car-at-rest is that it contains clashing parts [car-at-rest] and ½car-at-rest that ought not to be union-ed, but must be kept apart, hence the branching. As with superposition &, it suffices to combine strings of the same length (padding them with empty boxes h at either end, if necessary). An example with R equal to the set nc(U) of non-contradictory snapshots is (29), where ŝ, s 1 and s 2 are as in (27).
(29)ŝh ¼ bð½car-at-rest; s 2 Þ ½car-at-resth ¼ s 1 h & ncðUÞ hs 2 ¼ ½car-at-rest½car-at-resth & ncðUÞ h½car-at-rest; car-tree-contact½car-tree-contact
In general, we form s & R s# from strings s ¼ a 1 . . . a n and s# ¼ a# 1 . . . a# n that are both in R n for some fixed n, and let k be the largest i < n such that
5 An alternative toŝ (suggested by Stefan Kaufmann) is the branching string _ s def bð½car-at-rest; car-tree-contact; s 1 Þ½car-tree-contact:
obtained from the string s 4 in (27d) by unwinding may(s 1 ).
(27) d. s 4 def ½car-at-rest; car-tree-contact; mayðs 1 Þ½car-tree-contact:
According to _ s/s 4 , the car hit the tree (s 2 ) but may have instead stopped (s 1 ).
(In the case of (29), s ¼ s 1 h, s# ¼ hs 2 , n ¼ 3 and k ¼ 1.) The R-zipper s & R s# is defined iff k > 1, in which case s & R s# preserves all of s and as much of s# as s and R allow, the remainder of s# attaching to s via b.
That is, if k > 1, let (i) s$ be the superposition a 1 . . . a k & a# 1 . . . a# k of the k-length prefixes of s and s#
ii) s + and s# + be the suffixes of s and s# from positions k + 1 to n s + def a k+1 . . . a n s# + def a# k+1 . . . a# n so that s ¼ a 1 . . . a k s + and s#¼ a# 1 . . . a# k s# + (e.g. in (29), s + is [car-atrest]h while s# + is ½car-at-rest; car-tree-contact½car-tree-contact) (iii) s & R s# be s$ plus any remaining parts s + and s# + attached by concatenation and b, respectively,
The requirement k > 1 ensures that s# can attach to s, with s & R s# maximizing the attachment of s# to s. Next, given languages L, L# 4 R * , we collect R-zippers from their strings in the R-zipper
. . a n & R a# 1 . . . a# n ja 1 . . . a n 2 L and a# 1 . . . a# n 2 L# with a 1 [ a# 1 2 Rg:
The ordinary (non-branching) strings in L & R L# are the strings in R * belonging to the ordinary superposition L & L#.
represents cases of branching and counterfactual continuations, on which we might impose additional requirements (beyond snapshots being from R). Going back to before, the idea roughly is to represent a veridical reading of A before B, in which both arguments A and B are asserted to hold, by certain non-branching strings from (30) where L ¼ h * LðAÞ h * and L# ¼ h * LðBÞh * .(We say certain because such strings must satisfy additional constraints; e.g. an occurrence of an Astring must precede that of a B-string.) In a counterfactual reading where B is asserted not to hold, the strings branch.
6 For concreteness, let us focus on the branching reading of (2a) in which the car does not hit the tree. As a representative branching string for that reading, ŝ (i.e. bð½car-at-rest; s 2 Þ½car-at-restÞ) suggests that (2a) implies (31a).
(31) a. Before Pat stopped the car, it may have been the case that the car was on course to hit the tree. b. Before Pat stopped the car, it was going to hit the tree.
Indeed, depending on what we make of the phrase going to, we might extract (31b) from the following modification of ŝ. Let us add the snapshot a def ½car-at-rest; car-tree-contact to s 2 , deriving (as it were) as 2 from hs 2 by backward inertial flow (pbk).
(pbk) h½u 0 ð½uh + ½f uhÞ
We then sharpen (29) to (32).
(32) s 1 h & R as 2 ¼ bða; s 2 Þ½car-at-resth
In (32), s 1 depicts car stop, while as 2 depicts car hit tree. The transition in s 1 from ½car-at-rest to [car-at-rest] requires a force (assuming car-at-rest is inertial) that in (32) gives rise to a branch marking car hit tree counterfactual. It is easy to see how in general branching from the zipper arises from a force disturbing inertia: no force, no change in inertial fluents. Furthermore, a force leads to branching only if it is opposed. In (33), Pat does not contribute a force to stop the car; therefore, it is natural to read (33) as entailing the car hit the tree.
(33) Pat did not stop the car before it hit the tree.
Next, consider (34) and (35).
(34) The car was at rest before it hit the tree.
(35) The car came to rest before it hit the tree.
How can we account for reading before veridically in (34) but counterfactually in (35)? The car-hit-tree string as 2 cannot attach anywhere where the car is at rest (in (34)), but can attach before the car comes to rest (in (35)). We arrive at constraint (36), where before c and before t are the counterfactual and veridical forms, respectively, of before. It is useful to think of strings in j(s) as R-continuations of s, and to expand a language L into the language L j of R-continuations of strings in L L j def [ fjðsÞjs 2 Lg:
, with alternatives to s encoded in j(s) ÿ {s}. The crucial point is that R is a realis marker: beyond R, events may develop in as many different ways as j allows.
The presentation of the language L j above is designed to bring out the similarity with the interpretation of metaphysical might in Condoravdi (2002) . Condoravdi imposes a condition of historical necessity (Thomason 1984) on the metaphysical modal base, which is expressed above as (c1). To link L j to branching strings, it is convenient to alter the presentation slightly. Given a string s, let s R be the suffix of s cut off by the R-truncation s R of s in that
.) Next, let us collect the alternatives to s R specified by j(s) in This encoding generalizes to strings s and functions j such that j(s) is finite. 7 Conversely, from say, the branching string bð½R; s#Þbða; s$Þ b
we can get three R-continuations of [R]ab f½Rs#; ½Ras$; ½Rabg 4 jð½RabÞ:
The set of R-continuations obtained from a branching string is partial in the same sense that the snapshots are partial. What can we say about R-continuations? Can we, for instance, assume (37), which assigns s and s# the same R-continuations whenever they are identical up to R? 7 The order in which j R (s) is enumerated is immaterial, assuming we impose the following equations between branching strings bðbðs; s#Þ; s#Þ ¼ bðs; s#Þ bðbðs; s#Þ; s$Þ ¼ bðbðs; s$Þ; s#Þ not to mention, sb(s#,s$) ¼ b(ss#,s$) and ðss#Þs$ ¼ sðs#s$Þ. More in Fernando (2005) .
If (37) were true then by (c2), every string identical to s up to R must be in j(s) s R ¼ s# R implies s# 2 jðs#Þ ¼ jðsÞ and so by (c1),
We must reject (37) if we want more restricted sets j(s). (38) is a restriction corresponding to the normality condition in Beaver and Condoravdi (2003) .
(38) j(s) consists only of strings that are reasonably probable given what has happened up to R.
An argument against (38) is provided by the following passage from Landman (1992) .
if an accomplishment manages to get completed, it is unproblematic to assume (in retrospect) that the progressive is true during the development stage . . . even if the event gets completed against all odds. (p. 14)
It would seem that if we are to restrict j(s) to the 'reasonably probable' continuations, then that probability judgment had better be made on the basis of events not only up to R but also beyond R, contra (38). But then how are we to keep that probability judgment from degenerating to an assignment of 0 to counterfactual events and 1 to actual events? It is, of course, easy enough to replace j(s) in (38) by j(s) ÿ {s}. But it is even easier to put (38) and probabilities aside, and try make do with (36). (29) to (32).) We have defined R-zippers to be as close to superposition as R allows, zipping zippers as high up as we could without straying from R. This is in line with the constraint Maximise Discourse Coherence (MDC) in Asher & Lascarides (2003) if we agree that discourse coherence increases as the zipper is zipped (bringing the two strings closer together). Just as epistemic uncertainty (represented in a language as non-deterministic choice + between its possibilities/strings) is subject to entailment, indeterminism expressed by branching (b) is subject to coherence. A further constraint one might apply to counterfactual before, suggested by the initial branch point condition in Beaver & Condoravdi (2003) , is to sharpen the veridical before in the right-hand side of (36) to one moment before, strengthening (31b) to (31c).
(41) A before c B implies going-to ðBÞ one-moment-before t A (31) b. Before Pat stopped the car, it was going to hit the tree.
c. Up until Pat stopped the car, it was going to hit the tree.
Translating (41) into an English test is perhaps more awkward than is the case for (36). At any rate, it has a precise enough meaning for our discrete branching string representations: in the zipper representing A before c B, an A-string is formed by position k + 1, where k is as high up as the zipper zips up. (It is tempting to view (41) as an instance of MDC for counterfactual readings; any higher up and we get a veridical reading.) The discreteness here of time reflects the temporal granularity of the conceptualized event, and more generally, the perspectival character of branching. What one moment before and going-to(B) mean are arguably matters of perspective, not metaphysics. Similarly, the well in (2b) reflects how picky the continuations j(s) of a string s might be (one moment) before Pat stopped the car.
(2) a. Pat stopped the car before it hit the tree. b. The car did not hit the tree but it might well have.
CONCLUSION
Let us sum up. Events were formulated as strings over an alphabet consisting of sets of fluents in section 2. These strings were then extended along two dimensions, with an eye to Reichenbachian treatments of the perfect and the progressive. In section 3, strings were extended to the right (to attach the reference time for the perfect), subject to inertial constraints. And in section 4, they were extended sideways to accommodate branching beyond the reference time (for the progressive). We can extend strings lengthwise and sideways indefinitely to obtain, at the limit, worlds from extensions that satisfy appropriate constraints such as U-bivalence \ u2U h 0 ð½u + ½ uÞ (deciding at each moment whether u holds or not) and U-noncontradictoriness ncðUÞ* ¼ \ u2U ð½u; u 0 ;Þ (ruling out co-occurrences of u and u). But we need not proceed to the limit to examine entailments. Sidestepping worlds, we can work instead with superposition &, subsumption V, 0-constraints and zippers & R .
The question remains: what does all this have to say about Dowty's intuition that the progressive of an event is true at world w and time I if the event culminates in (I, w)-inertia worlds? Within our framework, an event culminates in a world containing a string representing the event. Attaching Reichenbach's reference time R to the right end point of the interval I, we allow branching at R so that the progressive of an event might be true in a world where that event does not culminate. Can we extract from this a concept of an (I, w)-inertia world where every event in progress at (I, w) is guaranteed to culminate? Not quite.
